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Abstract We give a complete characterization both in terms of security and design of all
currently existing group homomorphic encryption schemes, i.e., existing encryption schemes
with a group homomorphic decryption function such as ElGamal and Paillier. To this end, we
formalize and identify the basic underlying structure of all existing schemes and say that such
schemes are of shift-type. Then, we construct an abstract scheme that represents all shift-type
schemes (i.e., every scheme occurs as an instantiation of the abstract scheme) and prove
its IND-CCA1 (resp. IND-CPA) security equivalent to the hardness of an abstract problem
called Splitting Oracle-Assisted Subgroup Membership Problem (SOAP) (resp. Subgroup
Membership Problem, SMP). Roughly, SOAP asks for solving an SMP instance, i.e., for
deciding whether a given ciphertext is an encryption of the neutral element of the ciphertext
group, while allowing access to a certain oracle beforehand. Our results allow for contrib-
uting to a variety of open problems such as the IND-CCA1 security of Paillier’s scheme,
or the use of linear codes in group homomorphic encryption. Furthermore, we design a new
cryptosystem which provides features that are unique up to now: Its IND-CPA security is
based on the k-linear problem introduced by Shacham, and Hofheinz and Kiltz, while its
IND-CCA1 security is based on a new k-problem that we prove to have the same progressive
property, namely that if the k-instance is easy in the generic group model, the (k+1)-instance
is still hard.
Communicated by C. Boyd.
F. Armknecht
Arbeitsgruppe für theoretische Informatik und Datensicherheit,
Universität Mannheim, A5, 6, 68161 Mannheim, Germany
e-mail: armknecht@uni-mannheim.de
S. Katzenbeisser · A. Peter (B)
Security Engineering Group, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Mornewegstr. 32,
64293 Darmstadt, Germany
e-mail: andreas.peter@cantab.net
S. Katzenbeisser
e-mail: skatzenbeisser@acm.org
123
210 F. Armknecht et al.
Keywords Foundations · Homomorphic encryption · Public-key cryptography ·
IND-CCA1 security · Subgroup membership problem · k-Linear problem
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000) 94A60
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Homomorphic encryption schemes support computation on encrypted data. Such schemes
are of particular interest for various applications, such as Outsourcing of Computation [19],
Electronic Voting [3,10,12,13], Private Information Retrieval [33], Oblivious Polynomial
Evaluation [39], or Multiparty Computation [14].
The most prominent homomorphic encryption schemes, e.g., ElGamal [18], Paillier [42],
Damgård–Jurik [16], are homomorphic with respect to a single algebraic operation. That
is, the plaintext space forms a group (G, ◦) and, given encryptions of m, m′ ∈ G, one can
efficiently and securely compute an encryption of m ◦m′ without revealing m and m′. We will
call such schemes group homomorphic encryption schemes. Although fully homomorphic
schemes [9,49,20,21,47], i.e., schemes that allow one to evaluate any circuit over encrypted
data without being able to decrypt, provide a much higher flexibility compared to group
homomorphic schemes, the investigation of the latter still represents an important research
topic:
(1) The majority of existing homomorphic schemes are group homomorphic and there are
still many open questions regarding these schemes.
(2) For practical applications there is currently no alternative to such schemes.1
(3) Many constructions of schemes that support more than a single algebraic operation are
in particular group homomorphic as well (e.g., [1,6]).
(4) A comprehensive understanding of group homomorphic schemes leads to a better under-
standing of schemes that are homomorphic in a more general sense, since the underlying
structures are very similar.
Over the last decades, a variety of different approaches (and according hardness assump-
tions and proofs of security) has been investigated for constructing group homomorphic
schemes, such as the Quadratic Residuosity Problem [26], the Higher Residuosity Problem
[3], the decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) Problem [18,44], and the decisional composite
residuosity (DCR) Class Problem [16,42]. All these schemes have been investigated sepa-
rately, resulting in the fact that some of them are better understood than others. In particular,
much effort has been devoted to proving existing homomorphic schemes IND-CCA1 secure
(being the highest possible security level for a homomorphic scheme). For example, since
the introduction of Damgård’s ElGamal [15] in 1991, many works addressed the problem of
characterizing its IND-CCA1 security [25,50]. Similarly, while an IND-CPA security char-
acterization of ElGamal was given in 1998 (see [48]), the quest for a characterization of its
IND-CCA1 security has been in the focus for many years. Only in 2010, the quest concerning
1 For example, the most efficient implementation [22] of [21] states that the largest variant (for which a
security level similar to RSA-1024 is assumed) has a public key of 2.4 GB size and requires about 30 min to
complete certain operations.
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these two schemes has finally found an end due to [36]. Finding similar characterizations for
remaining homomorphic schemes, e.g., Paillier’s scheme, is still an open problem.
1.2 Contribution
In this work, we present a unified view both in terms of security and design on all currently
existing group homomorphic encryption schemes.2 On the one hand, this helps to access the
kind of challenges mentioned above more easily (and in fact, to answer open questions) and
on the other hand provides a systematic procedure for designing new schemes based on given
problems. Our concrete contributions are as follows:
1.2.1 Abstract security characterization
First, we identify and formalize the underlying structure of all existing group homomorphic
encryption schemes and say that group homomorphic schemes with this structure are of shift-
type. This particular structure allows us to construct an abstract scheme that represents all
shift-type group homomorphic encryption schemes and prove its IND-CCA1 security equiva-
lent to the hardness of a new abstract problem, called the Splitting Oracle-Assisted Subgroup
Membership Problem (SOAP), meaning that every scheme occurs as an instantiation of
the abstract scheme being IND-CCA1 secure if and only if the according instantiation of
SOAP is hard. This abstract scheme is similar to other existing abstract schemes [17,21,23]
but is necessarily more general in order to be a representative of all shift-type group homo-
morphic schemes. For a proper subclass of shift-type homomorphic schemes, a proof that if an
abstract Subgroup Membership Problem (SMP) is hard, then the scheme is IND-CPA secure
was given in [23]. Our result applies to a larger class of homomorphic schemes, namely to all
shift-type schemes, considers a higher security level (IND-CCA1 instead of IND-CPA) and
shows IND-CCA1 security equivalent to the hardness of SOAP. In fact, a characterization
of IND-CPA security through SMP is an immediate byproduct of our results.
1.2.2 Concrete security characterization
Our abstract security characterizations can be applied to concrete homomorphic schemes by
looking at the according instantiations. For example, several results such as the IND-CPA
security of ElGamal [48], the IND-CCA1 security of Damgård’s ElGamal [15,25,36,50]
and the recently proved IND-CCA1 security of ElGamal [36] can be easily derived from
our characterizations. Additionally, we use the IND-CCA1characterization to approach the
long standing open question, whether Paillier’s homomorphic encryption scheme [42] is
IND-CCA1 secure. Clearly, similar concrete security characterizations can be given for all
other group homomorphic schemes that are of shift-type.
Furthermore, we derive two impossibility results. First, we show that no group homo-
morphic scheme with a prime ordered ciphertext group can be IND-CPA secure. Second,
we prove that under certain conditions an IND-CPAgroup homomorphic scheme where the
ciphertexts form a linear subspace of Fn for some prime field F, can never be of shift-type. This
partly answers an open question whether using linear codes as ciphertext spaces yield more
efficient constructions (see [21]) in the sense that the construction cannot be of shift-type.
2 A precise definition will be given in Sect. 2.2.
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1.2.3 Systematic design approach
Another utilization of our results is a systematic approach for constructing provably secure
group homomorphic schemes. By using our abstract scheme and a concrete instantiation of
SOAP resp. SMP, one can directly specify a homomorphic scheme that is IND-CCA1 resp.
IND-CPA secure if and only if the respective problem is hard.
As an example, we consider the k-linear problem LPk [29,45] which is an alternative
to DDH in groups where DDH is easy, e.g., in bilinear groups [30]. After its introduction,
many works addressed the problem of constructing cryptographic protocols whose security is
based on the LPk (e.g., [5,27,29,31,35,40,45]). Continuing this line of research, we present
the first homomorphic scheme that is based on the LPk for k > 2 (k = 1 is ElGamal [18],
k = 2 is Linear Encryption [5]). In addition, we introduce a new k-problem (an instantiation
of SOAP) that we prove to be hard in the generic group model and to have the same pro-
gressive property as the LPk . This result might be of independent interest as it can be used to
construct new cryptographic protocols with unique features. For instance, we give the first
homomorphic scheme that can be instantiated with groups where DDH is easy (e.g., bilinear
groups) and is nevertheless provably secure in terms of IND-CCA1.
1.3 Separation from other related work
Aside from the related work that we have already mentioned in the previous sections, there
is a substantial number of papers on the construction of IND-CPA (respectively, IND-CCA1,
IND-CCA2) secure encryption schemes. In this regard, we would particularly like to mention
the work by Cramer and Shoup [11] who give a generic construction of IND-CPA (respec-
tively, IND-CCA1, IND-CCA2) secure encryption schemes through smooth (respectively,
1-universal, 2-universal) hash proof systems. Furthermore, Peikert and Waters [43] introduce
the notion of lossy trapdoor functions and give a generic construction of IND-CCA1 secure
encryption schemes from such functions, while Hemenway and Ostrovsky [28] give a generic
construction of IND-CCA1 secure group homomorphic encryption schemes through homo-
morphic hash proof systems, which are known to be constructable, e.g., from the Qua-
dratic Residuosity Problem, the DDH Problem or the DCR Problem. A somewhat different
approach to the construction of IND-CCA1 secure group homomorphic encryption was pre-
sented by Prabhakaran and Rosulek [44]. Therein, they build group homomorphic encryption
schemes that are secure in an even stronger sense than just being IND-CCA1, namely “homo-
morphic-CCA” secure.
All these works have in common that they build IND-CCA1 secure schemes from non-
interactive assumptions, while we show the IND-CCA1 security equivalent to the hardness
of SOAPwhich then naturally has to be an interactive problem, as IND-CCA1 is. Therefore,
we stress that we give characterizations of the security of group homomorphic schemes.
For all the above mentioned schemes this means that the underlying non-interactive assump-
tion either implies SOAP, or is equivalent to it. In the former case, breaking the underlying
assumption would not necessarily break the security of the scheme in question as it is actually
equivalent to SOAPwhich might still be a hard problem. We do not give a generic construc-
tion of IND-CCA1 secure group homomorphic schemes from non-interactive assumptions.
Concerning IND-CPA security on the other hand, this is a different story, as we propose an
abstract scheme that encompasses all shift-type group homomorphic encryption schemes and
hence is a also a generic way to construct IND-CPA secure group homomorphic schemes from
non-interactive assumptions. The latter is due to the fact that the corresponding SMP instance
is always non-interactive.
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1.4 Outline
Throughout the paper, we use standard notation and definitions that are summarized in Sect. 2.
Therein, we also formally define the class of group homomorphic encryption schemes, and
recall standard security notions for such schemes. In Sect. 3, we introduce the notion of
shift-type group homomorphic encryption, construct an abstract scheme and prove that it
represents all shift-type group homomorphic schemes. We define certain subgroup problems
(e.g., SOAPand SMP) in Sect. 4 and use them to prove the desired security characterizations.
Next, we instantiate these problems to analyze the security of existing schemes in Sect. 5, to
show certain impossibility results in Sect. 6, and to design a new scheme in Sect. 7.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 General definitions and notation
We write x ←− X if X is a random variable or distribution and x is to be chosen randomly
from X according to its distribution. In the case where X is solely a set, x U←− X denotes that
x is chosen uniformly at random from X . For an algorithm A we write x ←− A(y) if A out-
puts x on fixed input y according to A’s distribution. If A has access to an oracle O, we write
AO . Sometimes, we need to specify the randomness of a probabilistic algorithm A explicitly.
To this end, we interpret A as a deterministic algorithm A(y, r), which has access to values
r that are chosen uniformly at random from some randomness space. Furthermore, if X and
Y are random variables taking values in a finite set S, we define the statistical difference
between X and Y as Dist(X, Y ) := 12 ·
∑
s∈S |Pr[X = s] − Pr[Y = s]|. If Dist(X, Y ) ≤ ,
we say that X and Y are -close.
For a group G, we denote the neutral element by 1, and denote the binary operation on G
by “·”, i.e., G is written in multiplicative notation. We recall that a subgroup N of a group G
is said to be normal if z · n · z−1 ∈ N for all z ∈ G, n ∈ N . In particular, this means that if
G is an abelian group, then every subgroup N is normal. For a finite (not necessarily abelian)
group G, a non-trivial, proper normal subgroup N of G, and a fixed system of representatives
R ⊆ G of G/N , we recall the following fact:
Fact 1 Let τ be the restriction to R of the canonical surjection G → G/N , z 	→ z · N .
Now since R is a system of representatives of G/N , every z ∈ G can be uniquely written as
z = r · n with r ∈ R and n ∈ N . Therefore, τ is a bijection and there is a group structure
on R that is inherited from G/N : For r, r ′ ∈ R, we define r 
 r ′ := τ−1(τ (r) · τ(r ′)).
We denote the element in R that corresponds to the neutral element in G/N by 1. It is easy
to verify that with the defined operation 
, R becomes a group with neutral element 1. In
addition, we know that R ∩ N = 1, since R ⊆ G is a system of representatives of G/N .
If f : X → Y is a mapping between two sets X and Y , we write dom( f ) = X for the
domain of f and im( f ) for its image. In addition, we write f |S for the restriction of f to a
subset S ⊆ X , i.e. f |S : S → Y with f |S(s) := f (s) for all s ∈ S. If X and Y are groups
(multiplicatively written), and f is a group homomorphism, we write ker( f ) := {x ∈ X |
f (x) = 1} for the kernel of f . If f is surjective, we write f −1(y) := {x ∈ X | f (x) = y}
for the preimage of y under f for y ∈ Y . Surjective group homomorphisms are also called
group epimorphisms.
We describe computational problems P through experiments ExpPA,G(λ) for given proba-
bilistic algorithms A and G that run in time polynomial in a given parameter λ. The output of
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ExpPA,G(λ) is always defined to be a single bit. We then say that problem P is hard (relative
to G) if for all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms A there exists a negligible
function negl such that
∣
∣
∣
∣Pr[ExpPA,G(λ) = 1] −
1
2
∣
∣
∣
∣ ≤ negl(λ).
2.2 Group homomorphic public key encryption
The central notion in this paper is that of group homomorphic encryption. Basically, a public
key encryption scheme is called group homomorphic, if its decryption algorithm is a group
homomorphism. Since there are some subtleties to take care of, the following definition gives
a precise formalization of this notion.
Definition 1 (group homomorphic encryption) A public key encryption scheme E = (G,
E, D) is called group homomorphic, if for every output (pk, sk) of G(λ), the plaintext space
P and the ciphertext space Ĉ are (written in multiplicative notation) non-trivial groups such
that
– the set of all encryptions C := {c ∈ Ĉ | c ←− Epk(m), m ∈ P} is a non-trivial subgroup
of Ĉ
– the restricted decryption D∗sk := Dsk|C is a group epimorphism, i.e.
D∗sk is surjective and ∀c, c′ ∈ C : Dsk(c · c′) = Dsk(c) · Dsk(c′)
– sk contains an efficient decision function δ : Ĉ → {0, 1} such that
δ(c) = 1 ⇐⇒ c ∈ C
– the decryption on Ĉ \ C returns the symbol ⊥.
Remark 1 All “classical” homomorphic encryption schemes [15,16,18,23,24,26,38,41,42]
are indeed group homomorphic in terms of Definition 1. We note that for almost all these
schemes, we have Ĉ = C which lets the decision function be trivial. In these cases, the
decryption function is a group epimorphism on the whole of Ĉ and the special symbol ⊥
is not needed. In fact, we only introduced the decision function to encompass Damgård’s
ElGamal [15].
Remark 2 Furthermore, we note that it is straightforward to extend all of our results in this
paper to ring homomorphic encryption schemes, which are defined in precisely the same
way as group homomorphic schemes, except that every occurrence of the notion “group” is
replaced by “ring” in Definition 1.
We show that the set of encryptions of 1 ∈ P has a certain group-theoretic structure. For this,
we define
Cm := {c ∈ C | Dsk(c) = m}
as the set of all encryptions of m ∈ P .
Lemma 1 Let E = (G, E, D) be a group homomorphic encryption scheme that does not
necessarily have a decision function δ. Then,
(1) Cm = Epk(m, r) ·C1 for all m ∈ P and all random r. It follows that the set {Epk(m, r) |
m ∈ P} for a fixed r is a system of representatives of C/C1
(2) C1 is a proper normal subgroup of C such that |C1| = |Cm | for all m ∈ P .
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Proof We fix a random r and m ∈ P . Let c ∈ Cm and set c1 := c · Epk(m, r)−1. Then,
Dsk(c1) = m · m−1 = 1, i.e. c1 ∈ C1. Therefore, c = Epk(m, r) · c1 ∈ Epk(m, r) · C1.
Conversely, let c1 ∈ C1. Then, Dsk(Epk(m, r) · c1) = m · 1 = m, i.e. Epk(m, r) · c1 ∈ Cm .
The first statement of the lemma follows immediately.
With respect to the second claim, we show by contradiction that C1 = C. Therefore,
assume that C1 = C. Since the decryption D∗sk is surjective, this means that P is a trivial
group, which contradicts the definition of a homomorphic scheme. Now, by looking at the
definition of C1, we see that C1 = ker(D∗sk). Therefore, C1 is a normal subgroup of C (e.g.,
[34, p. 13]). The last claim is an immediate consequence of the equality Cm = Epk(m, r) ·C1.
unionsq
2.3 Security notions for public key encryption schemes
We briefly recall the three security notions indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack
(IND-CPA), indistinguishability under (non-adaptive) chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA1)
and indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) for public key
encryption schemes (cf. [2, Definition 2.1]) and explain their role in the group homomorphic
case.
Let E = (G, E, D) be a public key encryption scheme. We will write Oi (·) = ε, where
i ∈ {1, 2}, for an oracle function that always returns the empty string ε on any input. For
atk ∈ {cpa, cca1, cca2}, a given algorithm A = (A1, A2) and parameter λ, we consider the
following experiment:
Experiment Expind-atkA,G (λ):
1. (pk, sk) ←− G(λ)
2. (m0, m1, s) ←− AO1(·)1 (pk) where m0, m1 ∈ P and s a state of A1
3. Choose b U←− {0, 1} and compute c ←− Epk(mb)
4. d ←− AO2(·)2 (m0, m1, s, c) where d ∈ {0, 1}
5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if d = b and 0 otherwise,
where
if atk = cpa then O1(·) = ε and O2(·) = ε
if atk = cca1 then O1(·) = Dsk(·) and O2(·) = ε
if atk = cca2 then O1(·) = Dsk(·) and O2(·) = Dsk(·).
If atk = cca2, we further require that A2 is not allowed to ask its oracle to decrypt the
challenge ciphertext c.
We say that E is IND-ATK secure (relative to G) if the advantage
∣
∣
∣
∣Pr[Expind-atkA, G (λ) = 1] −
1
2
∣
∣
∣
∣ is negligible for all PPT algorithms A,
where ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}. Bellare et al. [2] show that IND-CCA2 is strictly stron-
ger than IND-CCA1, which in turn is strictly stronger than IND-CPA.
For reasons of completeness, we prove the following well-known result.
Theorem 1 (no IND-CCA2 security) Any group homomorphic encryption scheme E =
(G, E, D), that does not necessarily have a decision function δ, is insecure in terms of
IND-CCA2.
Proof On input the public key pk, the adversary A1 outputs two non-zero randomly chosen
plaintexts m0, m1 ∈ P with m0 = m1. The challenger chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}
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and computes the challenge ciphertext c ←− Epk(mb). Upon receiving the challenge, A2
computes ci ←− (c · Epk(mi )−1) for i ∈ {0, 1}, and asks the decryption oracle for the
decryptions of c0 and c1. By definition, one of these decryptions is 1, and A2 outputs the
index d ∈ {0, 1} of the decryption that corresponds to 1. Therefore, the advantage of A in
the IND-CCA2game is 12 , which is non-negligible. unionsq
Due to this Theorem, we know that IND-CCA1 is the strongest of the three security notions
for group homomorphic encryption schemes.
We remark that there exist three additional, standard security notions: Non-malleability
with respect to CPA,CCA1and CCA2. For details on these, we refer to [2] and note that,
for obvious reasons, no group homomorphic encryption scheme can be secure in terms of
these notions. Therefore, we do not consider these non-malleability notions. Also, we note
that non-standard variants, e.g., [7,44], lie outside of the scope of this paper.
3 Shift-type group homomorphic encryption
When looking at all the currently existing group homomorphic encryption schemes (see
Sect. 5 for examples), one notices a certain structure in the encryption procedure that all
these schemes have in common. Roughly speaking, the encryption procedure takes a plain-
text and adds some “noise”—this noise happens to be an encryption of 1. Formally, this
intuition is captured in the following definition.
Definition 2 A group homomorphic encryption scheme E = (G, E, D) is said to be of
shift-type, if the encryption algorithm satisfies the following equation for all random r and
all plaintexts m ∈ P:
Epk(m, r) = Epk(m, ρ) · Epk(1, r),
where ρ is a public value from the randomness space such that Epk(1, ρ) = 1.
This definition allows us to define an abstract scheme that we prove to be shift-type group
homomorphic. Additionally, we show that this abstract scheme encompasses all shift-type
group homomorphic schemes and thereby all existing group homomorphic schemes. We note
that in previous works, similar abstract schemes have been defined [17,21,23]. However, none
of the previous schemes is general enough to encompass all existing group homomorphic
schemes. Therefore, we introduce our new scheme, which we call GIFT (Generic shIFt-Type)
due to its generality in terms of Definition 2.
Definition 3 (GIFT scheme) GIFT is a public key encryption scheme EG = (G, E, D) with
Key generation: G takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs a tuple (pk, sk) where
pk is the public key that contains descriptions of
– a non-trivial group P of plaintexts and a non-trivial group Ĉ of ciphertexts together
with a non-trivial subgroup C ≤ Ĉ that will act as the set of encryptions
– a non-trivial, proper normal subgroup N of C such that |C/N | = |P|
– an efficient isomorphism ϕ : P −→ R where R ⊆ C (not necessarily a subgroup but
certainly a group, cf. Remark 1) is a system of representatives of C/N ,
and sk is the secret key that contains
– an efficient description of ϕ−1 ◦ ν with the epimorphism ν : C → R such that ν(c) is
the unique representative r ∈ R with c = r · n for some n ∈ N .
– an efficient function δ : Ĉ → {0, 1} such that δ(c) = 1 ⇐⇒ c ∈ C.
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Encryption: E takes the public key pk and a message m ∈ P as input and outputs the
ciphertext c := ϕ(m) · n ∈ C where n ←− N .
Decryption: D takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ Ĉ as input. If δ(c) = 0, it outputs
⊥, otherwise it outputs the plaintext ϕ−1(ν(c)) ∈ P .
Remark 3 In GIFTwe know that 1 ∈ N ,3 so
C1 = {c ∈ C | ϕ−1(ν(c)) = 1} = {c ∈ C | ν(c) = 1}
= {c ∈ C | 1 · c−1 ∈ N } = N ,
i.e. N is the group of all encryptions of 1.
Next, we prove that GIFT indeed is a shift-type group homomorphic encryption scheme, and
that every such scheme can be described in terms of GIFT.
Theorem 2 (generality) Every shift-type group homomorphic encryption scheme can be
described in terms of GIFT, and vice versa.
Proof We start by proving that GIFTEG = (G, E, D) fulfills Definition 1. By the definition
of EG, it suffices to show the correctness of the scheme and that D∗sk is a group epimorphism.
The correctness can be readily seen, since we know by definition that ν(r) = r for all
r ∈ R which implies ν(ϕ(m)) = ϕ(m) and ν(n) = 1 for all m ∈ P and all n ∈ N . Using
that ν and ϕ are homomorphisms, this yields for all m ∈ P :
ϕ−1(ν(ϕ(m) · n)) = ϕ−1(ν(ϕ(m)) · ν(1)) = ϕ−1(ϕ(m) · 1) = m.
Clearly, D∗sk = ϕ−1 ◦ ν is an epimorphism since it is the composition of two epimorphisms
with im(ν) = dom(ϕ−1). It is trivial to see that EG is of shift-type.
Conversely, let E = (G, E, D) be a shift-type group homomorphic scheme and let
(pk, sk) be an output of G(λ) (pk includes value ρ). We define N := C1, which is a proper
normal subgroup of C by Lemma 1. We consider the algorithm ϕ(·) := Epk(·, ρ) that takes
messages m ∈ P as input. Then, ϕ is an isomorphism on P since its inverse ϕ−1 is given
by the epimorphism Dsk|R where R := im(ϕ). By Lemma 1, we know that R is a system
of representatives of C/N . Then, we also know that |P| = |R| = |C/N |. Next, we define
a PPT algorithm E that takes the same inputs as E , i.e., the public key pk and a message
m ∈ P (written deterministically it also takes a random4 value z as input), and then does the
following:
(1) Compute n := Epk(1, z).
(2) Output c := ϕ(m) · n.
We show that Epk is an encryption algorithm as required in GIFT:
(1) By definition, we have n ∈ N = C1, meaning that we use Epk(1, ·) as the sampling
algorithm for N .
(2) The output c of Epk(m) has the form ϕ(m) · n with n ∈ N , as required.
Since E is of shift-type, we know that Epk and Epk have the same output.
3 Recall that we denoted the representative in R of 1 · N by 1.
4 Recall that we interpret PPT algorithms as deterministic algorithms by given them an additional input z that
is chosen uniformly at random from some randomness space (cf. Sect. 2).
123
218 F. Armknecht et al.
All remaining components of GIFT are given as follows: By considering ν : C → R
as ν := ϕ ◦ Dsk|C , one easily sees that Dsk(c) = ϕ−1(ν(c)), if c ∈ C. Otherwise, i.e. if
δ(c) = 0, we have Dsk(c) = ⊥. Hence, we have successfully described E in terms of GIFT.
unionsq
This description of all shift-type group homomorphic schemes allows us to restrict our atten-
tion to GIFT. We will make use of this fact in the next sections.
4 On the security of group homomorphic encryption schemes
4.1 Subgroup problems
In [23], Gjøsteen introduces a computational problem, called Splitting Problem (SP) together
with a related decisional problem, called Subgroup Membership Problem (SMP). We recall
these two problems and start with the former. For our results on the characterization of group
homomorphic schemes in Sect. 4.2, we need to extend Gjøsteen’s definition of the SP, as
we will explain momentarily.
Let Ĝ be a finite (not necessarily abelian) group, G a non-trivial subgroup of Ĝ, N a non-
trivial, proper normal subgroup of G, and R ⊆ G a fixed system of representatives of G/N .
Furthermore, we let δ : Ĝ → {0, 1} with δ(z) = 1 ⇐⇒ z ∈ G be an efficient decision
function.5
We recall that every z ∈ G can be uniquely written as z = r · n with r ∈ R and n ∈ N
and that there is a natural group structure on R that is inherited from G/N (cf. Remark 1).
Moreover, we notice that the following map is a bijection:
R × N → G given by (r, n) 	→ r · n.
We denote its inverse by σ and call σ the splitting map for (G, N , R).
Informally, the SP for (G, N , R) is to compute σ(z) for a randomly given z ∈ G. Before
we give a formal definition of SP, we note that our definition extends Gjøsteen’s in that
it considers a system of representatives that need not be a subgroup of G, while Gjøsteen
always assumes it to be a subgroup. In addition, we allow G to be a non-abelian group,
while Gjøsteen only considers the abelian case. Now let G be a PPT algorithm that takes a
security parameter λ as input and outputs (G, N , R) where G, N and R are descriptions of
the respective groups defined above. Consider the following experiment for given algorithms
G, A and parameter λ:
Experiment ExpSPA,G(λ):
1. (G, N , R) ←− G(λ)
2. (r, n) ←− A(G, N , R, z) where r ∈ R, n ∈ N and z U←− G
3. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if z = r · n and 0 otherwise.
This experiment defines the SP (relative to G).
Next, we recall the SMP. Let G be a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as
input and outputs descriptions (G, N ) of a non-trivial, proper subgroup N of a (not neces-
sarily abelian) finite group G. Consider the following experiment for a given algorithm G,
algorithm A and parameter λ:
5 In the following two definitions, we do neither need the decision function nor the group Ĝ. The importance
of these two objects will become clear later when we define the new problem SOAP.
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Experiment ExpSMPA,G (λ):
1. (G, N ) ←− G(λ)
2. Choose b U←− {0, 1}. If b = 1: z ←− G. Otherwise: z ←− N .
3. d ←− A(G, N , z) where d ∈ {0, 1}
4. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if d = b and 0 otherwise.
This experiment defines the SMP (relative to G) which, informally, states that given (G, N , z)
where z ←− G, one has to decide whether z ∈ N or not.
It is easy to see that if one can efficiently solve the SP for (G, N , R) one can also solve
the SMP for (G, N ): Let z ∈ G be the challenge of the SMP for (G, N ). By using the SP
solver, we can compute σ(z) = (r, n) and we have the relation that z ∈ N if and only if
r = 1. So deciding whether z ∈ N amounts to deciding whether r = 1 which is easy since
the neutral element 1 of R is always included in the description of R (cf. Sect. 2).
To mention just one of the many concrete instantiations of these two problems, we note
that the computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) Problem is an instance of the SP, while the
corresponding DDH Problem is an instance of the SMP. Further details and other famous
examples can be found in Sect. 5. Also, we want to mention that some other interesting
complexity-theoretic results on the SMPcan be found in [23, Sect. 2.1].
At this point, we are in a position that allows us to define a new abstract problem of
which two very special cases occur in [36]. Therein, it is proven that the hardness of one
of these problems is equivalent to the IND-CCA1 security of ElGamal, while the other’s is
equivalent to that of Damgård’s ElGamal. Informally, the new problem that we will call the
Splitting Oracle-Assisted Subgroup Membership Problem (SOAP) is situated in the same
setting as the SP (recall the groups Ĝ, G, N , R and the decision function δ) and consists of
two phases. In the first phase the adversary is given access to an oracle OĜ,G,N ,R, δSP (·) that
either solves the SP for (G, N , R) or outputs the special symbol ⊥ if the input was not an
element of G. In the second/challenge phase, the adversary has to solve the SMP for (G, N ).
Before we define this problem formally, we remark that it will allow us to deduce character-
izations of IND-CCA1 security of all group homomorphic encryption schemes in Sect. 4.2.
In particular, the characterizations for ElGamal and Damgård’s ElGamal [36] immediately
derive from our generic results.
We let G be a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs descrip-
tions (Ĝ, G, N , R, δ) of a non-trivial, proper normal subgroup N of a group G that is itself
a subgroup of a finite group Ĝ, a system of representatives R ⊆ G of G/N , and a decision
function δ : Ĝ → {0, 1} given by δ(z) = 1 ⇐⇒ z ∈ G. We consider the following
experiment for a given algorithm G, algorithm A = (A1, A2) and parameter λ:
Experiment ExpSOAPA,G (λ):
1. (Ĝ, G, N , R, δ) ←− G(λ)
2. s ←− AO
Ĝ,G,N ,R, δ
SP (·)
1 (Ĝ, G, N , R, δ) where s is a state of A1
3. Choose b U←− {0, 1}. If b = 1: z ←− G. Otherwise: z ←− N
4. d ←− A2(Ĝ, G, N , R, δ, s, z) where d ∈ {0, 1}
5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if d = b and 0 otherwise.
This experiment defines SOAP (relative to G). We note that the splitting oracleOĜ,G,N ,R, δSP (·)
does not solve a random instance of SP, rather it solves the SP for (G, N , R) which are
the parameters of the corresponding SMP the adversary has to solve in the challenge phase.
Therefore, we say that the splitting oracle solves the static SP (SSP), while “static” in this
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context refers to the SMP instance the adversary has to solve in the SOAPgame. This is why
we sometimes denote SOAPby SMPSSP following the notation of [36].
Examples of concrete instantiations of all just described subgroup problems can be found
in Sect. 5.1. In particular, we refer to Sect. 7, where we introduce new instantiations of
these problems which we use to construct new group homomorphic schemes with interesting
properties.
4.2 Security characterization
Our aim is to characterize all shift-type group homomorphic encryption schemes in terms
of the three standard security notions IND-CPA, IND-CCA1 and IND-CCA2 for public key
encryption schemes (cf. Sect. 2.3). Recall that by Theorem 1, we know that for group homo-
morphic encryption schemes IND-CCA1 is the strongest of the three security notions. There-
fore, characterizing shift-type group homomorphic schemes in terms of this notion is highly
desirable.
Theorem 3 (characterization of IND-CCA1 security) Let E = (G, E, D) be a shift-type
group homomorphic encryption scheme. Then:
E is IND-CCA1 secure (relative to G) ⇐⇒ SOAP is hard (relative to G).
Proof “⇐”: By Theorem 2, we know that we can restrict our attention to the GIFT scheme.
Therefore, we think of E being a particular instance of GIFTand assume that E is not
IND-CCA1 secure, i.e. there exists a PPT algorithm Acca1 = (Acca11 , Acca12 ) that breaks
the security with non-negligible advantage f (λ). We derive a contradiction by construct-
ing a PPT algorithm Asoap = (Asoap1 , Asoap2 ) that successfully solves SOAPwith advantage
1
2 f (λ).
Since SOAPand IND-CCA1are both considered relative to G, Asoap1 can simply forward
the public key pk = (P, Ĉ, C, N , R, ϕ) of the output of G(λ) to Acca11 . If Acca11 queries
the decryption oracle for a decryption of some ciphertext c ∈ Ĉ, Asoap1 asks the oracle
OĈ,C,N ,R, δSP (c) on input c which outputs the element σ(c) = (r, n) ∈ R × N if δ(c) = 1
and ⊥ otherwise. In the former case, it is readily seen that r = ν(c) and so Asoap1 forwards
the correct plaintext ϕ−1(r) to Acca11 (recall that we consider GIFT). In the latter case, Asoap1
simply forwards ⊥ to Acca11 .
After the query phase of Acca11 is over, Acca11 outputs two messages m0, m1 ∈ P to Asoap2 .
The SOAP challenger chooses a bit b U←− {0, 1} and sends the challenge c ∈ C to Asoap,
who then chooses a bit d U←− {0, 1} and sends the challenge cd := Epk(md) · c to Acca12 .
Now, Acca12 outputs a bit d ′ and sends it back to A
soap
2 which sends b′ := d ⊕d ′ to the SOAP
challenger.
We have the following relations: If b = 0, then c ∈ C1 and cd is a correct encryption of the
message md . Hence, Acca12 makes the right guess with advantage f (λ), i.e. Pr[b′ = b|b =
0] ≥ 12 + f (λ). If b = 1, then c ∈ C and cd looks like a random encryption. Hence, Acca12
guesses d with no advantage, i.e. Pr[b′ = b|b = 1] = 12 . We have shown:
Pr[ExpSOAPAsoap,G(λ) = 1] =
∑
β∈{0, 1}
Pr[b′ = b|b = β] · Pr[b = β]
≥ 1
2
·
(
1
2
+ f (λ) + 1
2
)
= 1
2
+ 1
2
f (λ).
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“⇒”: For the converse, we assume that there is a PPT algorithm Asoap = (Asoap1 , Asoap2 )
that solves SOAP with advantage f (λ). Similarly to what we have done above, we construct
a PPT algorithm Acca1 = (Acca11 , Acca12 ) that successfully breaks the IND-CCA1 security
with advantage f (λ).
Similarly to the above, Acca11 forwards the part (Ĉ, C, N , R, δ) of the output of G(λ) to
Asoap1 . If A
soap
1 queries the oracle OĈ,C,N ,R, δSP (c) on input c ∈ Ĉ, Acca11 asks the decryption
oracle for a decryption of c that outputs the plaintext m := Dsk(c) = ϕ−1(ν(c)) if δ(c) = 1
and ⊥ otherwise. In the former case, we notice that ϕ(m) ∈ R and so Acca11 sends the correct
SP solution (ϕ(m), ϕ(m) · c−1) to Asoap1 . In the latter case, Acca11 simply forwards ⊥ to
Asoap1 . After the query phase of A
soap
1 is over, Acca11 outputs two messages m0, m1 ∈ P . The
IND-CCA1 challenger chooses a bit b U←− {0, 1} and sends the challenge cb ←− Epk(mb)
to Acca12 , who then computes c := cb · Epk(m0)−1 ∈ C and sends the challenge c to Asoap2 .
Now, Asoap2 returns a bit d ′ to Acca12 that then outputs b′ := d ′ to the IND-CCA1 challenger.
We have the following relations: If b = 0, then c ∈ C1 and Asoap2 guesses b with advantage
f (λ), i.e. Pr[b′ = b|b = 0] ≥ 12 + f (λ). If b = 1, then c ∈ C \ C1 and Asoap2 guesses b again
with advantage f (λ), i.e. Pr[b′ = b|b = 1] ≥ 12 + f (λ). Therefore, we have shown:
Pr[Expind-cca1Acca1, G(λ) = 1] =
∑
β∈{0, 1}
Pr[b′ = b|b = β] · Pr[b = β]
≥ 1
2
· (1 + 2 f (λ)) = 1
2
+ f (λ).
unionsq
A careful study of the proof of Theorem 3 shows that, as a special case, we have also proven
a characterization of IND-CPA security. It is interesting to see that for this characterization
the decision function δ is not needed.
Theorem 4 (characterization of IND-CPA security) Let E = (G, E, D) be a shift-type
group homomorphic encryption scheme that does not necessarily have a decision function
δ. Then:
E is IND-CPA secure (relative to G) ⇐⇒ SMP ishard (relative to G).
Proof If Acpa = (Acpa1 , Acpa2 ) is a successful adversary on IND-CPA with advantage f (λ),
then the adversary Asoap2 from the first part of the proof of Theorem 3 successfully solves
SMPwith advantage 12 f (λ) when changing every occurrence of Acca1 by Acpa in the proof.
Conversely, let Asmp be a successful adversary on SMP with advantage f (λ). We con-
sider the adversary Acca1 = (Acca11 , Acca12 ) from the second part of the proof of Theorem 3.
Since here, Acca11 has no oracle access, it outputs two random messages m0, m1 ∈ P with
m0 = m1. Then, following the proof of Theorem 3 while changing every occurrence of Asoap
by Asmp in the proof, Acca1 successfully solves IND-CPAwith advantage f (λ). unionsq
We note that in [23], Gjøsteen already proved one of the implications for a much smaller class
of group homomorphic schemes, namely that if SMP is hard, then E is IND-CPA secure. We
stress that our result is more powerful since we consider the larger class of shift-type schemes
(that encompasses all existing group homomorphic schemes) and since we give the first proof
of the other implication which is the key ingredient for the highly desirable characterization.
Interestingly enough, compared to the IND-CCA1case, the IND-CPAcharacterization also
holds for shift-type group homomorphic schemes that do not have a decision function δ.
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5 Security characterization of existing schemes
One application of our approach is an easy characterization of IND-CPA and IND-CCA1 secu-
rity of existing schemes. For example, the results on the IND-CPA resp. IND-CCA1 security
of ElGamal, given in [48] resp. [36], and for Damgård’s ElGamal, given in [15] resp. [36],
are direct consequences as the next section shows. More interesting is the application to
open problems, and as an example, we will consider the IND-CCA1 security of Paillier’s
homomorphic encryption scheme [42] in Sect. 5.2.
5.1 Known security characterizations
We want to give two concrete instantiations of the three subgroup problems that we have
defined in Sect. 4.1, and instantiations of GIFT. Furthermore, we look at two schemes
whose security is based on the respective problem instantiation, namely ElGamal [18] and
Damgård’s ElGamal [15]. Finally, we analyse their security through our characterization
results, Theorems 3 and 4. Interestingly enough, the well-known security proofs of these
schemes [36,48] immediately derive from our general results. For other famous examples of
instantiations, we refer to [23] and [24], while we refer to Sects. 5.2 and 7 of this paper for
new instantiations.
5.1.1 ElGamal
In GIFT, we let Ĉ = C = G × G be the direct product of a cyclic group G (multiplicatively
written) of prime order p with generator g. Since Ĉ = C, the decision function δ : Ĉ → {0, 1}
is trivial, i.e. always outputs 1. We set P := G and let N = 〈(g, h)〉 be a subgroup of C
generated by (g, h) ∈ C where h := ga for a secret a U←− Zp . Since N ∩ R = {(1, 1)}
where R := 〈(1, g)〉 ≤ C with |R| = p, we know that R is a system of representatives of
C/N (the isomorphism is given by (1, gr ) 	→ (1, gr ) · N ). Trivially, we have the efficient
isomorphism ϕ : P → R given by gr 	→ (1, gr ). Also, we define an efficient epimorphism
ν : C → R given by (gr , gs) 	→ (1, gs ·g−ar ). We have successfully defined the ingredients
of the public key pk and the secret key sk as required in GIFT. Clearly, this instantiation of
GIFT is ElGamal [18].
Next, we look at the three subgroup problems for this particular instantiation. First, recall
that a triple of elements (g1, g2, g3) = (ga, gb, gγ ) ∈ G3 is called a Diffie–Hellman triple
if γ = a · b. Furthermore, one can easily check that (g2, g3) ∈ N if and only if (h, g2, g3)
is a Diffie–Hellman triple. The SP for (C, N , R) is the CDHproblem for (h, c1), since the
splitting map σ : C → R×N is given by (c1, c2) 	→ ((1, c2 ·c−a1 ), (c1, ca1)). The SMP for
(C, N ) is the DDHproblem for (h, c1, c2), and SOAP for (Ĉ, C, N , R, δ) is the problem
DDHSCDH where SCDH denotes the static CDH problem (cf. [36]).
In the ElGamal instantiation, we see that Theorem 4 states that ElGamal is IND-CPA secure
if and only if DDH is hard, while Theorem 3 states that it is IND-CCA1 secure if and only
if DDHSCDH is hard. The former characterization was proven in [48], while the latter was
proven in [36].
5.1.2 Damgård’s ElGamal
Again, we look at a concrete instantiation of GIFT. Here, we let Ĉ = G3 be the direct
product of a prime ordered cyclic group G with generator g, and set P := G. Furthermore,
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we choose random secrets a, b U←− Zp , compute the values h := ga, s := gs and set
C := 〈(g, h)〉 × G. For a ciphertext c = (c1, c2, c3) ∈ Ĉ we see that c ∈ C ⇐⇒ c2 = ca1 .
Therefore, we have found an efficient decision function δ : Ĉ → {0, 1}. Next, we set N :=
〈(g, h, s)〉 and R := 〈(1, 1, g)〉. Since N ∩R = {(1, 1, 1)} and |R| = p, we see that R is a
system of representatives of C/N (the isomorphism is given by (1, 1, gr ) 	→ (1, 1, gr )·N ).
We immediately derive an efficient isomorphism ϕ : P → R given by gr 	→ (1, 1, gr )
and define the map ν : C → R by (gr , hr , gt ) 	→ (1, 1, gt · g−br ). We have successfully
defined the ingredients of the public key pk and the secret key sk as required in GIFT and
easily see that this instantiation is Damgård’s ElGamal [15].
By considering the SP for (C, N , R) in this particular instantiation, we see that the
splitting map σ : C → R × N is given by (c1, c2, c3) 	→ ((1, 1, c3 · c−b1 ), (c1, c2, cb1)).
Therefore, this SP coincides with the CDH problem with parameters (g, s, gr ) for random
r
U←− Zp; In [36], this problem is denoted by CDEG. The SMP for (C, N ) is the DDHprob-
lem with parameters (g, s, gr , gt ) for random r U←− Zp and t ∈ Zp; In [36], this problem is
denoted by DDEG. Finally, SOAP for (Ĉ, C, N , R, δ) is the problem DDEGSCDEG where
SCDEG is the static CDEG (cf. [36]).
For this instantiation, i.e. for Damgård’s ElGamal, Theorem 4 states that it is IND-CPA
secure if and only if DDEG is hard, while Theorem 3 states that it is IND-CCA1 secure if
and only if DDEGSCDEG is hard. The former characterization was proven in [15], while the
latter was very recently proven in [36].
5.2 Paillier’s scheme
We briefly recall Paillier’s homomorphic encryption scheme [42] by plugging the appropri-
ate parameters into GIFT. Therefore, let n = pq be an RSA-modulus and set Ĉ := C :=
Z
∗
n2
, P := Zn and N := {rn mod n2 | r ∈ Z∗n}. Recall the following homomorphism
Eg : Zn × Z∗n −→ Z∗n2 with Eg(x, y) := g x · yn mod n2
for an element g ∈ Z∗
n2
. It is known that Eg is an isomorphism if g = 1 + n [8] or, more
generally, if g is a multiple of n [42]. In these cases, there is a unique tuple (x, y) ∈ Zn ×Z∗n
for each ω ∈ Z∗
n2
with Eg(x, y) = ω. The value x is called the n-th residuosity class of ω
(with respect to g), denoted by ωg . The problem of computing ωg for given ω ∈ Z∗n2
and g is called the Computational Composite Residuosity (CCR) problem. Paillier showed
that when the factorization of n is known, it is easy to compute ωg given ω and g. The
problem of deciding whether x = ωg , given ω, g and x , is called the Decisional Composite
Residuosity (DCR) Problem.
In the following, we fix g ∈ Z∗
n2
such that Eg is an isomorphism and consider the sub-
group R := 〈h〉 of C generated by h := 1 + n. In [11, Sect. 8.2.1], it is shown that
R = {1 + an mod n2 | a ∈ Zn} with |R| = n = |C/N | (in particular, we can efficiently
solve discrete logarithm in R due to this simple structure). In fact, R is a system of repre-
sentatives of C/N :
Lemma 2 Let π : C → C/N be the canonical epimorphism, i.e. π(c) := c · N . Then, the
map ρ := π |R : R → C/N is an isomorphism, i.e. R is a system of representatives of
C/N .
Proof Since ρ, as the restriction of π , is a homomorphism and |R| = |C/N |, it suffices to
show that ρ is injective. Therefore, let ha mod n2 ∈ ker(ρ) = N ∩ R for some a ∈ Zn , i.e.
there exists z ∈ Z∗n such that ha ≡ zn (mod n2). But N is a group and so there exists an
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element y ∈ Z∗n such that yn · zn ≡ 1 (mod n2), i.e. ha · yn ≡ 1 (mod n2). This in turn implies
that Eh(a, y) ≡ 1 (mod n2). But Eh is an isomorphism, i.e. (a, y) = (0, 1) ∈ Zn ×Z∗n which
implies ha mod n2 = 1 mod n2 and so ρ is injective. unionsq
Trivially, we have the isomorphism ϕ : P → R given by m 	→ 1 + mn mod n2. By
[42, Lemma 1 + Lemma 2], we know that the “class function” ·g : Z∗n2 → Zn is a group
epimorphism and so the mapping ν : C → R given by c 	→ hcg mod n mod n2 is a group epi-
morphism. It can be efficiently computed when the factorization of n is known [42, Theorem
1]. Since we can solve discrete logarithms in R very efficiently, computing ν(c) is equivalent
to computing cg .
We have successfully defined the public key pk = (n, g) and the secret key sk = (p, q) in
GIFT. The resulting scheme is Paillier’s homomorphic encryption scheme [42]. Observe that
the splitting map σ : C → R×N is given by ω 	→ (ωg, ω · g−ωg ). We immediately see
that the SP in this instantiation is the CCRproblem. Furthermore, N contains by definition
all elements rn mod n2 for r ∈ Z∗n . Therefore, the SMP for (C, N ) is the DCRproblem. As
a consequence of Theorems 3 and 4, we get the following characterizations of the security
of Paillier’s scheme:
Theorem 5 (security characterization of Paillier) Paillier’s scheme is IND-CCA1 (resp.
IND-CPA) secure if and only if DCRSCCR (resp. the DCRproblem) is hard.
We note that the DCRSCCR is a new (though naturally arising) problem and so a thorough
analysis of its hardness is advisable. Since such an analysis lies outside of the scope of this
paper, we leave it as an open question.
Damgård and Jurik proposed an extension of Paillier’s scheme to a generalised group struc-
ture [16]. We stress that we can achieve a similar characterization of the IND-CCA1 security
of their scheme by applying similar thoughts as the above.
6 Impossibility results
In this section, we show two impossibility results. The first is stated in the following easy
corollary:
Corollary 1 Let E = (G, E, D) be a shift-type group homomorphic encryption scheme
that does not necessarily have a decision function δ. If C is a group of prime order, then E is
insecure in terms of IND-CPA.
Proof Since C has prime order, we know that C1 is trivial, i.e. it is easy to decide membership
in C1. Hence, the scheme cannot be IND-CPA secure by Theorem 4. unionsq
Of course, this result easily extends to the general case: Whenever C1 is trivial, we just choose
1 as one of the messages in the IND-CPAchallenge and can then simply check whether the
challenge ciphertext is the single element in C1 or not.
The second result is motivated by the question whether IND-CPA secure code-based group
homomorphic schemes exist. For instance, [1] presents a symmetric shift-type group homo-
morphic scheme (that even allows for a limited amount of multiplications) based on linear
codes. The immediate question that arises is, whether this scheme works in the public key
setting as well. In [20, p. 10], it is asked more generally, whether it is possible to construct a
fully homomorphic scheme that is code-based.
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Let F be a prime field. Recall that a linear code of length n and rank k is a linear sub-
space C ⊆ Fn of the vector space Fn such that dim(C) = k. Theorem 4 partly answers the
question from above, when the ciphertext space Ĉ is a linear code. We need the following
two Lemmata:
Lemma 3 Let U ⊆ V be a non-trivial linear subspace of a F-vector space V with dim(U ) =
k and dim(V ) = n. Furthermore, we assume that we can sample from U uniformly at random.
For all 1 ≤  ≤ k, we have: If (u1, . . . , u) U←− U , then the probability that u1, . . . , u
are linearly independent is
∏
i=1(1 − |F|i−k−1).
In particular, if  = k, the probability that the tuple (u1, . . . , uk) U←− U k is linearly
independent equals
∏k
i=1(1 − |F|−i ).
Proof The proof works by induction on 1 ≤  ≤ k. The case  = 1 is trivial. So let  > 1 and
let (u1, . . . , u−1)
U←− U −1. By the induction hypothesis, we know that this is a linearly
independent tuple with probability
∏−1
i=1 (1−|F|i−k−1). Now, since dim(U ) = k, U has pre-
cisely |F|k many elements. On the other hand, there are precisely |F|−1 many vectors in U that
are linearly dependent to (u1, . . . , u−1), so the probability that u1, . . . , u−1, u are line-
arly dependent, where u
U←− U , is |F|−1/|F|k = |F|−k−1. In total this means that the tuple
(u1, . . . , u) is with probability
∏−1
i=1 (1−|F|i−k−1) · (1−|F|−k−1) =
∏
i=1(1−|F|i−k−1)
linearly independent. If  = k, this value equals ∏ki=1(1 − |F|−i ). unionsq
This Lemma essentially says that when choosing k vectors of U uniformly at random, the
probability that these vectors are linearly dependent is negligible in the size of F, i.e. they
form a basis of U , except with negligible probability in |F|. By replacing all occurrences of the
uniform distribution in the proof by a distribution that is -close to the uniform distribution,
we immediately see the following consequence.
Lemma 4 Let U ⊆ V be a non-trivial linear subspace of a F-vector space V with dim(U ) =
k and dim(V ) = n. Furthermore, let D be a distribution on U that is -close to the uniform
distribution. If  is negligible in |F|, then the probability that the tuple (u1, . . . , uk) ←− U k
(sampled according to D) is linearly dependent is negligible in |F|.
This yields the desired impossibility result:
Theorem 6 Let E = (G, E, D) be a shift-type group homomorphic encryption scheme,
that does not necessarily have a decision function δ, such that the set of encryptions C is a
k-dimensional linear subspace of Fn and such that the output distribution of the encryption
algorithm is -close to the uniform distribution for some  that is negligible in |F|. Then, E
is insecure in terms of IND-CPA (relative to G).
In particular this holds if C (or the ciphertext space Ĉ)6 is a linear code.
Proof According to Theorem 4, we only have to show that SMP is not hard (relative to G).
Therefore, we show that, when given a ciphertext c ∈ C, there is an efficient algorithm that
can decide whether c ∈ C0 or not.
By using Epk with input 0, we can efficiently sample from C0. By Lemma 4, this means
that we can efficiently construct a basis (c1, . . . , cs) of C0, where s := dim(C0), by sam-
pling s times at random from C0. If (c1, . . . , cs) is linearly dependent, which happens with
negligible probability, we sample again until we get a linearly independent tuple.
6
F is a prime field and so the notion of subgroups coincides with the notion of F-subspaces (see [32, Theorem
2.1.8(b)]). Since we assume C to be a subgroup of Ĉ, it follows that if Ĉ is a linear code, then C is a linear code
as well.
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Note that, since F is a prime field, C0 is actually an F-subspace of C (see [32, Theorem
2.1.8(b)]). On the other hand, the basis vectors c1, . . . , cs of C0 are vectors in Fn . Therefore,
when given an arbitrary ciphertext c ∈ C, we can efficiently compute the rank r of the matrix
(c, c1, . . . , cs). If r = s, we know that c ∈ C0, otherwise c ∈ C0. unionsq
We remark that the same attack also works in the following settings, making the impossibility
result more general:
(1) If E is also homomorphic with respect to the scalar multiplication in V = Fn (i.e.
decryption is F-linear), we do not need the restriction that F is a prime field.
(2) Theorem 6 also holds for arbitrary n-dimensional F-vector spaces V , if there is a (pub-
licly known) efficiently computable isomorphism from V to Fn (the inversion must be
efficiently computable as well). We note that this is not always the case, as is seen by
considering ElGamal’s encryption scheme (see Sect. 5.1):
Certainly, the ciphertext group C = G × G of ElGamal is a 2-dimensional Fp-vector
space, where G is cyclic group of prime order p. In addition, it is easily seen that the
group C1 of all encryptions of 1 is in fact an Fp-subspace of C. So, if there would be
a publicly known and efficiently computable isomorphism F : C → F2p , Theorem 6
would break ElGamal. Fortunately, we can prove that no such isomorphism can exist:
Claim. If there exists an efficient isomorphism F : C → F2p , we can efficiently solve
discrete logarithms in G (which is supposed to be hard in the setting of ElGamal).
Proof Assume that F : C → F2p is an efficiently computable isomorphism. Let 1 =
g ∈ G be an arbitrary element of G, i.e., G = 〈g〉. Now, for a given h ∈ G, we can
compute logg(h) by computing logF(g, g) (F(h, h)). This works since F is Fp-linear
(i.e., F(h, h) = logg(h) · F(g, g) and so logF(g, g) (F(h, h)) = logg(h)) and solving
discrete logarithms in the additive group F2p is easy. unionsq
In the situation of [1], Theorem 6 implies that their scheme is, in the public key setting,
insecure in terms of IND-CPA.
7 A homomorphic scheme based on k-linear
In [30], Joux and Nguyen point out the need for cryptographic protocols whose security
is not based on DDHby showing that in bilinear groups, the DDHproblem is always easy.
This issue has been addressed by Boneh et al. [5] by introducing an alternative to the DDH
problem called the Decisional Linear Problem (LP) and describing a homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme that is based on this new problem. Independently of each other, Hofheinz and
Kiltz [29], and Shacham [45] gave a generalization of the LP to the so-called Decisional
k-Linear Problem (LPk). They prove that, in the generic group model [46], LPk+1 is hard
even if LPk is easy. Following the warning by Joux and Nguyen, they formulate the need for
protocols whose security is based on LPk . We note that LP1 is the DDH problem, while LP2
is the decisional LP. Since the introduction of the LPk , many protocols have been designed
whose security is based on it, e.g. [5,27,29,31,35,40,45] to name just a few. However, a
homomorphic encryption scheme whose IND-CPA security is based on the LPk for k > 2 is
still missing.
In this section, we close this gap and do even more. We first recall the computational and
the decisional k-linear problem (CLPk , resp. LPk) and formulate the new problem LPSCLPkk
which is an instance of SOAP defined in Sect. 4.1, whereas SCLPk is the static-CLPk , i.e. it
is defined with respect to the public parameters of the underlying LPk problem in LPSCLPkk
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(cf. Sect. 4.1). Trivially, we have the relation that if LPSCLPk+1k+1 is easy, then so is LPSCLPkk .
In addition, it is shown in [36] that DDHSCDH = LPSCLP11 is hard for generic groups which
proves that LPSCLPkk is also hard. Furthermore, we prove in the generic group model that
if LPSCLPkk is easy, then LP
SCLPk+1
k+1 is still hard. Thus, we have found a new problem with
the same desirable property as LPk . This result might be of independent interest as it can be
used to construct new cryptographic protocols. For instance, we introduce a homomorphic
encryption scheme whose IND-CCA1 security is based on LPSCLPkk while its IND-CPA secu-
rity is based on the decisional k-linear problem. Thereby giving the first IND-CCA1 secure
homomorphic scheme that can be instantiated with groups where DDH is easy, e.g., bilinear
groups.
7.0.1 The k-linear problem
Fix k ∈ N. Let Ĉ := C := Gk+1 where G is a cyclic group of prime order p, generated by
g. Furthermore, we choose ai
U←− Z∗p for i = 1, . . . , k and set N := {(ga1r1 , . . . , gakrk ,
g
∑k
i=1 ri ) | ∀i = 1, . . . , k : ri ∈ Zp} and R := 〈1〉k × G. Clearly, |N | = pk, |R| = p and
N ∩R = {(1, . . . , 1)}. Therefore, R is a system of representatives of C/N (the isomorphism
is given by (1, . . . , 1, gr ) 	→ (1, . . . , 1, gr ) · N ). The splitting map σ : C → R × N for
(C, N , R) is given by
(c1, . . . , ck+1) 	→
⎛
⎝
⎛
⎝1, . . . , 1, ck+1 ·
( k∏
i=1
c
a−1i
i
)−1⎞
⎠ ,
(
c1, . . . , ck,
k∏
i=1
c
a−1i
i
)⎞
⎠ .
Now, the CLPk is the SP for (C, N , R) while the LPk is the SMP for (C, N ). As a new prob-
lem, we define LPSCLPkk as the instance of SOAP for (Ĉ, C, N , R, δ) where the decision
function δ is trivial since Ĉ = C.
7.0.2 The cryptosystem and its security
Let Ĉ, C, N , R, δ, g and the ai ’s be as in the previous section. Furthermore, we set P := G.
We have the isomorphism ϕ : P → R given by m 	→ (1, . . . , 1, m) and the epimorphism
ν : C → R given by (c1, . . . , ck+1) 	→
(
1, . . . , 1, ck+1 · ∏ki=1 c
−a−1i
i
)
. We have success-
fully defined all the ingredients for GIFT for a fixed k ∈ N. The resulting cryptosystem can
be summarized as follows:
Key generation: Input. Security parameter λ. Output. sk = (a1, . . . , ak) and pk = (p, g,
g1 := ga1 , . . . , gk := gak ) where ai U←− Z∗p for i = 1, . . . , k and g is a generator of a
cyclic group G of prime order p such that λ is the length of the binary representation of p.
Encryption: Input. Public key pk and plaintext m ∈ G. Output. Ciphertext c with
c := (gr11 , . . . , grkk , m · g
∑k
i=1 ri )where ri
U←− Zp for i = 1, . . . , k.
Decryption: Input. Secret key sk and ciphertext c = (c1, . . . , ck+1) ∈ Gk+1. Output. Plain-
text m := ck+1 · ∏ki=1 c
−a−1i
i .
When instantiated with k = 1 the above cryptosystem is ElGamal [18], while for k = 2 it is
the linear encryption scheme introduced in [5]. For the security of the introduced cryptosys-
tem, Theorems 4 and 3 yield:
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Corollary 2 The above cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure (resp. IND-CCA1 secure) if and
only if LPk (resp. LPSCLPkk ) is hard.
Concerning the hardness of the new problem LPSCLPkk , we start with a trivial fact:
Theorem 7 (on the hardness of LPSCLPkk )
(1) If LPSCLPk+1k+1 is easy, then so is LPSCLPkk .
(2) LPSCLP11 is hard in the generic group model (see [36]) and so LPSCLPkk is hard in the
generic group model (by using 1.)
Additionally (and this is the more important result), we show the following:
Theorem 8 (LPSCLPkk in the Generic Group Model) In the generic group model, we have
the following Progressive Property:
If LPSCLPkk is easy, then LPSCLPk+1k+1 is still hard.
7.1 Proof of Theorem 8
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p. Similarly to Shacham’s proof [45] of the progres-
sive property of LPk , we prove an even stronger result than Theorem 8 by using multilinear
maps [4]. We call an efficient map ek : Gk → GT k-multilinear, if ek(zr11 , . . . , zrkk ) =
ek(z1, . . . , zk)
∏k
i=1 ri for all z1, . . . , zk ∈ G and r1, . . . , rk ∈ Zp .
In what follows, we show that in generic groups featuring a (k + 1)-multilinear map
LPSCLPkk is easy, but LP
SCLPk+1
k+1 is hard. This result implies Theorem 8.
We make extensive use of Shacham’s paper [45], starting with a trivial consequence of
one of his results. In Lemma B.1 of [45] it is shown that when given a (k + 1)-multilinear
map, there is an efficient algorithm for deciding LPk . Immediately, this yields:
Corollary 3 Given a (k + 1)-multilinear map, there is an efficient algorithm for solving
LPSCLPkk .
Next, we give an upper bound on the success probability of an LPSCLPkk -adversary in the
presence of a k-multilinear map. We proof this results along the lines of [45] (wherein a
similar results is proven for LPk).
Lemma 5 If a q-step (q ≥ 2k) adversary A solves LPSCLPkk in the generic group model
(featuring a k-multilinear map), then its success probability is at most q·(q+2k+4)22p .
Proof First, we stress that the computational LPk are all equivalent to each other [45], and
we can therefore restrict our attention to the problem LPSCDHk . Now, let g0 be a generator
of G, and a1, . . . , ak, y U←− Zp . We set gi := gai0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and g := gy0 .
Furthermore, let r1, . . . , rk, s
U←− Zp and d U←− {0, 1}, and set Td := gy
∑k
i=1 ri
0 and
T1−d := gs0. The adversary A is first given access to an SCDH oracle and then receives the
opaque representations for the elements
g0, ga10 , . . . , g
ak
0 , g
y
0 , g
a1r1
0 , . . . , g
akrk
0 , T0, T1. (1)
Upon reception, A outputs a bit d ′ and wins, if d ′ = d .
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Let Q ≤ q be the number of queries made by the adversary to the SCDHoracle. In the
generic group model, the SCDHoracle is equivalent to the multiplication with the element
y (cf., [36]). So in the challenge phase, the adversary A does not only get the opaque rep-
resentations for the elements in (1), but also representations of gy20 , . . . , gy
Q+1
0 . As usual
in the generic group model [37], we have an algorithm B that, internally, keeps track of
elements handled by A as polynomials in the ring Zp[A1, . . . , Ak, Y, R1, . . . , Rk, S] and,
externally, describes these as arbitrary opaque strings in some sufficiently large domain. It
maintains these two representations in two lists {(Fi , ξi )} and {(FT, i , ξT, i )} for elements
of G and GT , respectively. We assume that the domain for external representations is large
enough so that, except with negligible probability, A can only query for elements it previ-
ously obtained from B, and B never outputs the same opaque representation for two different
elements.
Now, in the challenge phase, A is provided with elements that B internally represents by
the following polynomials:
g0 : F = 1, g1 : F = A1, . . . , gk : F = Ak, g : F = Y, . . . , gyQ+1 : F = Y Q+1
and gr11 : F = A1 R1, . . . , grkk : F = Ak Rk, T0 : F = T0, T1 : F = T1.
On these elements to which A is given opaque representations, A can perform the following
operations by using B:
– Group action: On input two elements of G, internally represented as F1 and F2, B adds
F ′ := F1 + F2 to the representation list of G (if not already there), and outputs with the
corresponding external representation. The group action for GT is handled analogously.
– Inversion: On input an element of G, internally represented as F, B adds F ′ := −F
to the representation list of G (if not already there), and outputs with the corresponding
external representation. The inversion for GT is handled analogously.
– Multilinear map: On input k elements of G (internally represented as F1, . . . , Fk) B adds
F ′ := ∏ki=1 Fi to the representation list of GT (if not already there), and outputs with
the corresponding external representation.
We see that for all F on the representation list for G, we have deg(F) ≤ q , while for all FT
on the representation list for GT , we have deg(FT ) ≤ 2k. After placing the remaining q − Q
queries (recall that A is allowed to make q steps in total) to these operations, it outputs its
guess d ′ for d .
Now, B chooses a1, . . . , ak, y, r1, . . . , rk, s U←− Zp . If we set
A1 := a1, . . . , Ak := ak, Y := y, R1 := r1, . . . , Rk := rk, (2)
Td := y ·
k∑
i=1
ri , T1−d := s, (3)
the simulation engineered by algorithm B is consistent with these values unless there are two
distinct polynomials F1 and F2 on the representation list for G or two distinct polynomials
FT, 1 and FT, 2 on the representation list for GT that take on the same value under the assign-
ment above. It remains to show that A cannot construct such a collision independently of
the choice of the random values and that the probability that the choice of random values
produces a collision is bounded. We recall that A additionally has the opaque representations
of y2, . . . , yQ+1 due to the SCDH oracle.
Certainly, the probability that there are at least two equal values among y, y2, . . . , yQ+1
is negligible in p, and since all the random values are independent of each other, except for the
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value of Td = y ·∑ki=1 ri , the adversary A must produce a multiple of Y ·
∑k
i=1 Ri , say F =
XY
∑k
i=1 Ri for some non-zero X , only by using the terms in (2) and (3). Clearly, any mono-
mial that can be produced from A1, . . . , Ak, Y, . . . , Y Q+1, A1 R1, . . . , Ak Rk, Td , T1−d
by using the above described operations is divisible by Ai if it is divisible by Ri for each
i = 1, . . . , k. Furthermore, for every i , each monomial in the expansion of XY Ri in F =
XY
∑k
j=1 R j must be divisible by Ai , hence Ai | X (a formal proof of this fact is given in
[45]). Therefore, F is divisible by the k + 2 monomials A1, . . . , Ak, Y and Ri for some i .
Since A only knows Y and its powers Y 2, . . . , Y Q+1, and since no term Aa Ab is known to A
for any a, b, forming F would require taking the product of at least k +1 of the polynomials
available to the adversary. But the multilinear map only allows for forming the product of at
most k terms. Thus, A cannot produce F and is hence unable to cause a collision.
Finally, we give an upper bound for the probability that a random choice of the values
a1, . . . , ak, y, r1, . . . , rk, s causes the same value on two distinct polynomials. Since the
degrees of the polynomials in the representation list of G are upper bounded by q , the proba-
bility that two such polynomials have the same evaluation for some random values is at most
q
p (over the choice of values) (cf., [46, Lemma 1]). Analogously, this probability is at most 2kp
for polynomials in the representation list of GT since the degrees of these are upper bounded
by 2k. In the challenge phase, the two representation lists consist together of 2k + Q + 4
values. When the adversary A does its remaining q − Q queries, the lists contain at most
q + 2k + 4 values, and the success probability of A is bounded by
(
q + 2k + 4
2
)
q
p
≤ q · (q + 2k + 4)
2
2p
.
In particular, constant success probability requires q = ( 3√p) steps. unionsq
Therefore, we have proven Theorem 8 by taking Corollary 3 and Lemma 5 together.
8 Conclusion
In this work, we gave a unified view on group homomorphic encryption schemes by iden-
tifying and abstracting their most fundamental properties (in particular, by identifying the
shift-type structure). This view allowed us to give complete characterizations both in terms of
design and security of all existing group homomorphic schemes. Beside these all-embracing
characterizations, we also deduced new theoretical insights on existing schemes and their
security (e.g., regarding Paillier’s scheme), on subgroup problems (e.g., the identification of
the naturally arising problem SOAP) and derived two impossibility results (e.g., regarding
the use of linear codes). On the practical side, our unified framework enables us to construct
new encryption schemes quite easily, which we emphasize by giving an example based on
the LPk that in particular, led to the construction of a new problem with the same desirable
progressive property in the generic group model.
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